On 4 May 2000, an email with the subject line “ILOVEYOU” started in Manila and reached Hong Kong, Europe and the United States the same day. The attached VBScript sent itself to everyone in the Outlook address book, overwrote files on local disks and network shares, and downloaded a password-stealing program.
The UK House of Commons shut down its mail servers for two hours on 4 May. In the United States, the Departments of Justice and Labor, the Social Security Administration, the CIA and the Department of Defense were among the affected agencies.
When run, it copies itself to the system folder as MSKernel32.vbs and Win32DLL.vbs and adds itself to the Registry to run at every startup.
ILOVEYOU is a VBScript worm that exploited the trust users placed in a “love letter” attachment from someone they knew. Because Windows hid known file extensions, the attachment appeared as LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT, a harmless text file.
The worm did not spread by a single route. Email was the main channel; it also sent files to people joining mIRC chat channels and replaced files on network shares with copies of itself. A colleague who opened a “photo” in a shared folder restarted the infection.
Its author, Onel de Guzman, had written a thesis at AMA Computer College in Manila proposing a program to steal internet access passwords; the college rejected the proposal. In 2020 he told journalist Geoff White that he wrote the worm and that the first version was restricted to run only in Manila.
Also known as: Love Bug, Love Letter, VBS/LoveLetter
| Type | Value | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Email attachment | LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.vbs | Subject “ILOVEYOU”, body “kindly check the attached LOVELETTER coming from me.” |
| File | %System%\MSKernel32.vbs | Copy that runs at startup. |
| File | %Windows%\Win32DLL.vbs | Second copy that runs at startup. |
| File | script.ini | In the mIRC folder; sends the file to anyone joining the channel. |
| File | LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.HTM | Copy sent over IRC. |
| File | WIN-BUGSFIX.exe | Password stealer downloaded through Internet Explorer. |
| Registry | HKLM\…\CurrentVersion\Run\MSKernel32 | Persistence. |
| Registry | HKLM\…\CurrentVersion\RunServices\Win32DLL | Persistence. |
| Registry | HKLM\…\CurrentVersion\Run\WIN-BUGSFIX | Persistence of the downloaded program. |
| Registry | HKCU\…\Windows Scripting Host\Settings\Timeout | The script time limit is removed. |
| Registry | HKCU\…\Internet Explorer\Main\Start Page | Changed to the download address. |
| Registry | HKCU\Software\Microsoft\WAB\* | Record of contacts the message was sent to. |
| Extension | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| .vbs, .vbe | Replaced with the worm’s code. | CERT/CC |
| .js, .jse, .css, .wsh, .sct, .hta | Replaced with the worm’s code; the extension becomes .vbs (x.css → x.vbs). | CERT/CC |
| .jpg, .jpeg | Replaced with the worm’s code; .vbs is appended (x.jpg → x.jpg.vbs). | CERT/CC |
| .mp3, .mp2 | The original file is hidden and a copy named x.mp3.vbs is left next to it. | CERT/CC |
The worm was noticed not through analysis but through its own speed: as corporate mail servers filled with messages carrying the same subject line, email systems shut down one after another.
The script was unencrypted VBScript, so it was read within hours. Philippine service providers traced the link that first spread the worm to a phone line registered at an apartment linked to de Guzman.
No computer was found in the 8 May raid; the diskettes left behind led the investigation to other students at the same college. At the time the Philippines had no law defining computer crime, so prosecutors turned to a law on credit card fraud; the charges were dropped in August.
| Organization | Country | Impact | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| House of Commons | United Kingdom | Mail servers were shut down for two hours. | CNN |
| Banking system | Belgium | Financial institutions were affected. | US GAO |
| Departments of Justice and Labor, Social Security Administration | US | Affected along with most federal agencies. | US GAO |
| CIA, Department of Defense | US | Operations were affected. | US GAO |
| US Army | US | 2,258 workstations; $79,200 cost. | US Army |
| Veterans Health Administration | US | 7 million messages; 240 person-hours of cleanup. | US GAO |
| NASA | US | Some files could not be recovered from backup. | US GAO |
| Measure | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Systems reported by the evening of 8 May | More than 500,000 (650 organizations) | CERT/CC |
| Computers infected in the first 24 hours | 10–45 million | EBSCO Research Starters |
| Share of internet-connected computers | About 10% | Wikipedia |
| Estimated economic damage | $3–15 billion (2020s estimate ~$10 billion) | WTOP / AP |
| Recorded variants | More than 25 | Wikipedia |
ILOVEYOU showed that trust in “an attachment from someone you know” was enough on its own. Today the same trust is exploited with invoices and sharing links sent from compromised corporate mailboxes.
The goal has changed: staying quiet instead of deleting files. Today’s infostealers finish what WIN-BUGSFIX tried to do, collecting the passwords, cookies and sessions in the browser within minutes and putting them up for sale.
Track ransomware groups, victim posts and indicators of compromise, and see the records that match your own assets.
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