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TermData

Malware path

The full location of the file the malware ran from on the infected device; in logs it shows where the infection came from.

Flow

  1. 1Recorded
  2. 2Pattern emerges
  3. 3Source found
Related families
Raccoon Stealer
MITRE ATT&CK
T1082 · System Information Discovery
Sources
4 sources
01

Overview

Most infostealers write the path of their own executable to the system information file. This path tells what the user ran: a “crack” file in the Downloads folder, an archive extracted in a temporary folder or a fake installer. MITRE ATT&CK

Malware imitates system folders and familiar file names in this path to look legitimate. MITRE ATT&CK

02

How it works

  1. 1

    Recorded

    The malware writes the path it ran from to the system information file. MITRE ATT&CK

  2. 2

    Pattern emerges

    In logs from the same campaign, the path and file name repeat.

  3. 3

    Source found

    The path points to the distribution channel: game cheat, activator, fake update.

03

Real-world examples

Raccoon: the AppData\Local folder

Raccoon Stealer profile

Zscaler documented that the second version of Raccoon downloads legitimate libraries such as nss3.dll and sqlite3.dll and gathers the stolen data in the user’s AppData\Local folder before sending it. Zscaler

04

How to detect it

  • Unsigned processes starting from the %TEMP%, %APPDATA% and Downloads folders. MITRE ATT&CK
05

What to do

  • Restrict executables from launching in user-writable folders with application control. MITRE ATT&CK
06

MITRE ATT&CK

07

Related families and terms

08

Sources

  1. 1System Information Discovery (T1082) · MITRE ATT&CK
  2. 2Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location (T1036.005) · MITRE ATT&CK
  3. 3Raccoon Stealer v2: the latest generation · Zscaler, 2022
  4. 4Behavior Prevention on Endpoint (M1040) · MITRE ATT&CK
From the Essential plan

Infostealer Detection

See your firm's attack surface on one screen: how many findings, at which severity, on which domain.