DecliningWindowsCredential theft
Malware Intelligence

Arkei

Arkei is an infostealer that collects browser passwords and autofill data, crypto wallets and files matching a pattern defined by the attacker. Its code base formed the basis of Vidar and, indirectly, Mars and StealC.

Activity map

Activity mapExecutionPackagingExfiltrationEXEPayloadFrom the AppData folder 9…ArkeiInfostealerData collection17 targetsLog archiveC2 server
Executable payloadFileDark Radar evidence
Malicious payloadArkei · Infostealer

Arkei is an infostealer that collects browser passwords and autofill data, crypto wallets and files matching a pattern defined by the attacker. Its code base formed the basis of Vidar and, indirectly, Mars and StealC.

Environment information

  • Operating system
  • Hardware
  • IP and location
  • Installed software
  • Desktop files

Credentials and application data

  • Saved passwords
  • Session cookies
  • Autofill
  • Saved cards
  • Discord
  • Steam
  • Telegram
  • Exodus
  • Electrum
  • Atomic Wallet
  • Bitcoin Core
  • Ethereum keystore
  • Coinomi
Dark Radar infection records
119,473
Latest infection record
4 June 2026
Malware type
Infostealer
First seen
May 2018
01

Overview

Ranks 16 of 52 families in Dark Radar data, with 119,473 infection records.

Other names: ArkeiStealer

02

Origin and evolution

  1. May 2018Emerged.Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE)
  2. 2018Vidar was created by forking its code.Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE)
  3. 2022New derivatives, including Mars Stealer, were tracked.SANS ISC
03

Technical profile

Malware typeInfostealer
Target operating systemWindows
Primary purposeData theft
Threat categoryCredential theft
Programming languageC++
Distribution modelSold on forums
First seenMay 2018
Infected systemsWindows 11 54%, Windows 10 45%
Public source confidenceHigh
04

Targeted applications

17 applications5 categories
05

Data collection

Credentials

  • Browser passwords97.5%Verified
  • Session cookies95.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Refreshing expired sessions—
  • Autofill72.5%Verified
  • macOS Keychain—
  • 2FA and password managers—

Financial

  • Saved cards10.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Desktop crypto wallets3%Verified
  • Wallet extensions—
  • Clipboard address replacement—

Applications

  • Email clients—
  • FTP clients—
  • VPN clients—
  • Messaging applications17.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Gaming platforms16%Dark Radar observation

System

  • File collection43%Verified
  • Screenshot—
  • System inventory100%Verified
06

File system

User profile (%USERPROFILE%)
File details are in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
07

System components

  • System information
08

How it works

  1. 1Execution and evasion

    Dark Radar observation

    The payload ran from the AppData folder (latest 200 logs, 98.5%).

    T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File

    Breaking point: Unsigned files running from user folders and injections into .NET tools are stopped by application control and EDR.

  2. 2Discovery

    Dark Radar observation

    Infected systems: Windows 11 54%, Windows 10 45%.

    T1082System Information DiscoveryT1083File and Directory Discovery

    Breaking point: Bulk system and security software queries from a short-lived process trigger an EDR alert.

  3. 3Data collection

    • Browser, wallet and pattern-matching file data.
    Dark Radar observation

    Data found in the latest 200 logs: password file 97.5%, cookies 95.5%, autofill 72.5%, cards 10.5%, wallets 3%.

    T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1005Data from Local SystemT1560Archive Collected Data

    Breaking point: A process other than the browser reading browser profile files is blocked or triggers an alert.

  4. 4Exfiltration and C2

    • Upload to the attacker's panel as a single ZIP archive.
    T1071.001Web ProtocolsT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

    Breaking point: Traffic to newly registered domains, direct IP addresses and non-standard ports is blocked.

09

Network communication

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
10

MITRE ATT&CK

Execution
Credential Access
Discovery
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
11

IOCs and detection

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
12

Risk and impact

  • Stolen session cookies are enough to take over cloud, email and SaaS sessions without a password or multi-factor authentication prompt.
  • Corporate passwords saved on personal devices also leak through infections outside the corporate network; these logs are sold to initial access brokers.
  • Log archives are reshared for years; as long as the password is not changed, the same credential can be used again and again.
  • Compromised email, messaging and social media accounts become the next link in phishing and malware distribution.
13

Defense

  • When an infection is detected, revoke not only the password but all related sessions and access tokens.
  • Turn off password saving in the browser through corporate policy; use a corporate password manager.
  • Move to phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (FIDO2/passkey); bind sessions to the device.
  • Block setup files downloaded from unlicensed software, game cheats and sponsored search results.
  • Monitor flows where the user runs a command by pasting it into the Run dialog or terminal (ClickFix) with endpoint rules.
  • Continuously monitor your corporate domains and employee email addresses in stealer logs with Dark Radar.
14

Learning center

How does this malware spread?
  • The payload ran from the AppData folder (latest 200 logs, 98.5%).
  • Infostealer families mostly spread through unlicensed software, fake updates, sponsored search ads and phishing emails.
How can its presence on a system be detected?
  • Sign-ins to accounts from an unrecognized country or device.
  • A new infostealer log in Dark Radar for your corporate domain or an employee email address.
Which Windows artifacts should be examined?
  • Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch) — shows that a short-lived payload ran.
  • Amcache.hve and ShimCache — path and hash of the executed file.
  • Downloads folder and Zone.Identifier stream — the address the file was downloaded from.
  • Browser history — the fake download page or fake CAPTCHA address.
  • RunMRU registry key — commands pasted into the Run dialog.
  • Randomly named folders and DLLs under %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%.
Which log records matter?
  • Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688Process creation: unsigned processes starting from Temp and Downloads folders, mshta, powershell -enc chains.
  • Sysmon Olay 11 / 23File creation and deletion: self-deleting payloads, DLLs dropped under Temp.
  • Sysmon Olay 3 / 22Network connection and DNS query: to newly registered domains, C2 resolution via Telegram, Steam or Pastebin.
  • Object access auditing (4663)A process other than the browser reading Login Data, Cookies and Local State files.
  • PowerShell 4104Script block logging: obfuscated downloader commands.
  • Identity provider sign-in logsSessions after the infection from a different country and device, without a multi-factor authentication prompt.
Which MITRE techniques is it associated with?
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1082System Information DiscoveryT1005Data from Local SystemT1071.001Web ProtocolsT1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1083File and Directory DiscoveryT1560Archive Collected Data
How should a SOC analyst respond?
  1. Isolate the device from the network; do not reinstall it before taking memory and disk images.
  2. Determine the infection date; list all accounts that were signed in on the device after that date.
  3. Change the passwords of these accounts, revoke their sessions and access tokens, and re-enroll multi-factor authentication devices.
  4. Search identity provider and SaaS logs for new country, device and token usage after the infection.
  5. If a recovery phrase or wallet file was exposed, move the assets to a new wallet.
  6. Find the initial access path (email, ad, unlicensed software, fake CAPTCHA) and check other users who used the same path.
  7. Reinstall the device from a clean image.
15

Sources

Related families

VidarStealCCompare

Related terms

Malware family
From the Essential plan

Infostealer Detection

See your firm's attack surface on one screen: how many findings, at which severity, on which domain.

View productCompare plans