Active threat familyWindowsCredential theft
Malware Intelligence

META Stealer

META is an infostealer that went on sale in March 2022, claiming to carry the same functionality, code and panel as RedLine. It filled the gap while Raccoon was temporarily halted.

Disrupted together with RedLine under Operation Magnus in October 2024.

Activity map

NCC GroupMalpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE)

Activity mapAttachmentEnable contentExecutionPackagingExfiltrationPhishing emailPayment, invoiceXLSExcel attachmentVBA macroDownload from aremote serverPayloadMETA StealerInfostealerData collection22 targetsLog archiveC2 server
Executable payloadFile
Malicious payloadMETA Stealer · Infostealer

META is an infostealer that went on sale in March 2022, claiming to carry the same functionality, code and panel as RedLine. It filled the gap while Raccoon was temporarily halted.

Environment information

  • Operating system
  • Hardware
  • IP and location
  • Installed software
  • Security software
  • Desktop files

Credentials and application data

  • Saved passwords
  • Session cookies
  • Autofill
  • Saved cards
  • Steam
  • Telegram
  • Discord
  • MetaMask
  • Exodus
  • Electrum
  • Atomic Wallet
  • Bitcoin Core
  • Ethereum keystore
  • Coinomi
Dark Radar infection records
2,270,426
Latest infection record
10 October 2026
Malware type
Infostealer
First seen
March 2022
01

Overview

Ranks 4 of 52 families in Dark Radar data, with 2,270,426 infection records.

Other names: MetaStealer

02

Origin and evolution

  1. March 2022Put up for sale by an actor named "_META_".Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE)
  2. May 2022Its spread increased after Raccoon halted.NCC Group
  3. October 2024Disrupted by Operation Magnus.Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE)
03

Technical profile

Malware typeInfostealer
Target operating systemWindows
Primary purposeData theft
Threat categoryCredential theft
Programming language.NET (C#)
Distribution model$125 per month or $1,000 unlimited license
First seenMarch 2022
Infected systemsWindows 10 46%, Windows 11 18%
Public source confidenceHigh
04

Targeted applications

22 applications8 categories
05

Data collection

Credentials

  • Browser passwords100%Verified
  • Session cookies75%Verified
  • Refreshing expired sessions—
  • Autofill55%Verified
  • macOS Keychain—
  • 2FA and password managers—

Financial

  • Saved cardsVerified
  • Desktop crypto wallets6%Verified
  • Wallet extensionsVerified
  • Clipboard address replacement—

Applications

  • Email clients—
  • FTP clientsVerified
  • VPN clientsVersion-dependent
  • Messaging applications12.5%Verified
  • Gaming platforms13%Verified

System

  • File collection17.5%Verified
  • Screenshot—
  • System inventory99%Verified

Behavior

  • Additional payload downloadVerified
  • Persistence—
  • Anti-analysis—
06

File system

User profile (%USERPROFILE%)
File details are in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
07

System components

  • The same system inventory as RedLine: hardware, security software, location, installed software
08

How it works

  1. 1Infection

    • Email campaigns with malicious attachments (macro-enabled documents).
    T1566.001Spearphishing Attachment

    Breaking point: Email attachments, sponsored ad links and unlicensed software downloads are blocked at the email and web gateway.

  2. 2Execution and evasion

    • The payload is unpacked in memory and the configuration is decoded.
    Dark Radar observation

    The payload ran from the AppData folder (latest 200 logs, 32.9%).

    Ran inside the legitimate RegAsm.exe process (latest 200 logs, 15.7%).

    Ran inside the legitimate aspnet_compiler.exe process (latest 200 logs, 8.6%).

    T1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

    Breaking point: Unsigned files running from user folders and injections into .NET tools are stopped by application control and EDR.

  3. 3Discovery

    • System inventory.
    Dark Radar observation

    Infected systems: Windows 10 46%, Windows 11 18%.

    T1082System Information DiscoveryT1518.001Security Software DiscoveryT1518Software DiscoveryT1614System Location Discovery

    Breaking point: Bulk system and security software queries from a short-lived process trigger an EDR alert.

  4. 4Data collection

    • Browser, wallet and application data.
    Dark Radar observation

    Data found in the latest 200 logs: password file 100%, cookies 75%, autofill 55%, cards 2.5%, wallets 6%.

    T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1005Data from Local System

    Breaking point: A process other than the browser reading browser profile files is blocked or triggers an alert.

  5. 5Exfiltration and C2

    • Sending to the C2 server.
    T1071.001Web ProtocolsT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

    Breaking point: Traffic to newly registered domains, direct IP addresses and non-standard ports is blocked.

09

Network communication

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
10

MITRE ATT&CK

Initial Access
Execution
Credential Access
Discovery
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Defense Evasion
11

IOCs and detection

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
12

Risk and impact

  • Stolen session cookies are enough to take over cloud, email and SaaS sessions without a password or multi-factor authentication prompt.
  • Corporate passwords saved on personal devices also leak through infections outside the corporate network; these logs are sold to initial access brokers.
  • Log archives are reshared for years; as long as the password is not changed, the same credential can be used again and again.
  • Compromised email, messaging and social media accounts become the next link in phishing and malware distribution.
13

Defense

  • When an infection is detected, revoke not only the password but all related sessions and access tokens.
  • Turn off password saving in the browser through corporate policy; use a corporate password manager.
  • Move to phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (FIDO2/passkey); bind sessions to the device.
  • Block setup files downloaded from unlicensed software, game cheats and sponsored search results.
  • Monitor flows where the user runs a command by pasting it into the Run dialog or terminal (ClickFix) with endpoint rules.
  • Continuously monitor your corporate domains and employee email addresses in stealer logs with Dark Radar.
14

Learning center

How does this malware spread?
  • Email campaigns with malicious attachments (macro-enabled documents).
  • The payload ran from the AppData folder (latest 200 logs, 32.9%).
How can its presence on a system be detected?
  • Sign-ins to accounts from an unrecognized country or device.
  • A new infostealer log in Dark Radar for your corporate domain or an employee email address.
Which Windows artifacts should be examined?
  • Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch) — shows that a short-lived payload ran.
  • Amcache.hve and ShimCache — path and hash of the executed file.
  • Downloads folder and Zone.Identifier stream — the address the file was downloaded from.
  • Browser history — the fake download page or fake CAPTCHA address.
  • RunMRU registry key — commands pasted into the Run dialog.
  • Randomly named folders and DLLs under %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%.
Which log records matter?
  • Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688Process creation: unsigned processes starting from Temp and Downloads folders, mshta, powershell -enc chains.
  • Sysmon Olay 11 / 23File creation and deletion: self-deleting payloads, DLLs dropped under Temp.
  • Sysmon Olay 3 / 22Network connection and DNS query: to newly registered domains, C2 resolution via Telegram, Steam or Pastebin.
  • Object access auditing (4663)A process other than the browser reading Login Data, Cookies and Local State files.
  • PowerShell 4104Script block logging: obfuscated downloader commands.
  • Identity provider sign-in logsSessions after the infection from a different country and device, without a multi-factor authentication prompt.
Which MITRE techniques is it associated with?
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentT1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1082System Information DiscoveryT1005Data from Local SystemT1071.001Web ProtocolsT1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1518.001Security Software DiscoveryT1518Software DiscoveryT1614System Location DiscoveryT1027Obfuscated Files or Information
How should a SOC analyst respond?
  1. Isolate the device from the network; do not reinstall it before taking memory and disk images.
  2. Determine the infection date; list all accounts that were signed in on the device after that date.
  3. Change the passwords of these accounts, revoke their sessions and access tokens, and re-enroll multi-factor authentication devices.
  4. Search identity provider and SaaS logs for new country, device and token usage after the infection.
  5. If a recovery phrase or wallet file was exposed, move the assets to a new wallet.
  6. Find the initial access path (email, ad, unlicensed software, fake CAPTCHA) and check other users who used the same path.
  7. Reinstall the device from a clean image.
15

Sources

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