Active threat familyWindowsCredential theft
Malware Intelligence

Remus

Remus is a new infostealer assessed to be the 64-bit evolution of Lumma Stealer. It resolves C2 addresses from blockchain smart contracts (EtherHiding); this method replaces the Steam and Telegram intermediate resolvers.

Activity map

Activity mapDownloadsC2 addressPackagingExfiltrationAddress2cLoaderInstallerRemusInfostealerSmart contractEtherHidingData collection22 targetsLog archiveC2 server
Malicious payloadRemus · Infostealer

Remus is a new infostealer assessed to be the 64-bit evolution of Lumma Stealer. It resolves C2 addresses from blockchain smart contracts (EtherHiding); this method replaces the Steam and Telegram intermediate resolvers.

Environment information

  • Operating system
  • Hardware
  • IP and location
  • Installed software

Credentials and application data

  • Saved passwords
  • Session cookies
  • Autofill
  • Saved cards
  • Telegram
  • Steam
  • Discord
  • MetaMask
  • Phantom
  • Coinbase Wallet
  • Trust Wallet
  • Binance Wallet
  • TronLink
  • Exodus
Dark Radar infection records
269,922
Latest infection record
29 October 2026
Malware type
Infostealer
First seen
2026
01

Overview

Ranks 11 of 52 families in Dark Radar data, with 269,922 infection records.

02

Origin and evolution

  1. 2026Identified by Gen Digital as a 64-bit variant of Lumma.Gen Digital
  2. 2026Seen distributed together with Vidar via 2cLoader.Zscaler
03

Technical profile

Malware typeInfostealer
Target operating systemWindows
Primary purposeCredential and session theft
Threat categoryCredential theft
Programming languageC (64-bit)
Distribution modelSubscription service (MaaS)
First seen2026
Infected systemsWindows 10 50%, Windows 11 48%
Public source confidenceMedium
04

Targeted applications

22 applications6 categories
05

Data collection

Credentials

  • Browser passwords100%Verified
  • Session cookies97.5%Verified
  • Refreshing expired sessions—
  • Autofill98.5%Dark Radar observation
  • macOS Keychain—
  • 2FA and password managers—

Financial

  • Saved cards9%Dark Radar observation
  • Desktop crypto wallets68.5%Verified
  • Wallet extensionsVerified
  • Clipboard address replacement—

Applications

  • Email clients—
  • FTP clients—
  • VPN clients—
  • Messaging applications18%Dark Radar observation
  • Gaming platforms14.5%Dark Radar observation

System

  • File collection—
  • Screenshot—
  • System inventory100%Verified

Behavior

  • Additional payload download—
  • Persistence—
  • Anti-analysisVerified
06

File system

User profile (%USERPROFILE%)
File details are in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
07

System components

  • System information
  • Additional analysis environment checks
08

How it works

  1. 1Infection

    • Loaders such as 2cLoader.

    Breaking point: Email attachments, sponsored ad links and unlicensed software downloads are blocked at the email and web gateway.

  2. 2Execution and evasion

    • Additional anti-analysis checks.
    Dark Radar observation

    The payload ran from the temporary folder (latest 200 logs, 12%).

    Breaking point: Unsigned files running from user folders and injections into .NET tools are stopped by application control and EDR.

  3. 3Discovery

    Dark Radar observation

    Infected systems: Windows 10 50%, Windows 11 48%.

    Breaking point: Bulk system and security software queries from a short-lived process trigger an EDR alert.

  4. 4Data collection

    • Browser passwords, cookies and crypto assets.
    Dark Radar observation

    Data found in the latest 200 logs: password file 100%, cookies 97.5%, autofill 98.5%, cards 9%, wallets 68.5%.

    Breaking point: A process other than the browser reading browser profile files is blocked or triggers an alert.

  5. 5Exfiltration and C2

    • The C2 address is read from a smart contract on the blockchain, then data is sent.

    Breaking point: Traffic to newly registered domains, direct IP addresses and non-standard ports is blocked.

09

Network communication

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
10

MITRE ATT&CK

11

IOCs and detection

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
12

Risk and impact

  • Stolen session cookies are enough to take over cloud, email and SaaS sessions without a password or multi-factor authentication prompt.
  • Corporate passwords saved on personal devices also leak through infections outside the corporate network; these logs are sold to initial access brokers.
  • Log archives are reshared for years; as long as the password is not changed, the same credential can be used again and again.
  • Compromised email, messaging and social media accounts become the next link in phishing and malware distribution.
13

Defense

  • Restrict traffic from endpoints to blockchain RPC services according to business need.
  • When an infection is detected, revoke not only the password but all related sessions and access tokens.
  • Turn off password saving in the browser through corporate policy; use a corporate password manager.
  • Move to phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (FIDO2/passkey); bind sessions to the device.
  • Block setup files downloaded from unlicensed software, game cheats and sponsored search results.
  • Monitor flows where the user runs a command by pasting it into the Run dialog or terminal (ClickFix) with endpoint rules.
  • Continuously monitor your corporate domains and employee email addresses in stealer logs with Dark Radar.
14

Learning center

How does this malware spread?
  • Loaders such as 2cLoader.
  • The payload ran from the temporary folder (latest 200 logs, 12%).
How can its presence on a system be detected?
  • Sign-ins to accounts from an unrecognized country or device.
  • A new infostealer log in Dark Radar for your corporate domain or an employee email address.
Which Windows artifacts should be examined?
  • Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch) — shows that a short-lived payload ran.
  • Amcache.hve and ShimCache — path and hash of the executed file.
  • Downloads folder and Zone.Identifier stream — the address the file was downloaded from.
  • Browser history — the fake download page or fake CAPTCHA address.
  • RunMRU registry key — commands pasted into the Run dialog.
  • Randomly named folders and DLLs under %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%.
Which log records matter?
  • Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688Process creation: unsigned processes starting from Temp and Downloads folders, mshta, powershell -enc chains.
  • Sysmon Olay 11 / 23File creation and deletion: self-deleting payloads, DLLs dropped under Temp.
  • Sysmon Olay 3 / 22Network connection and DNS query: to newly registered domains, C2 resolution via Telegram, Steam or Pastebin.
  • Object access auditing (4663)A process other than the browser reading Login Data, Cookies and Local State files.
  • PowerShell 4104Script block logging: obfuscated downloader commands.
  • Identity provider sign-in logsSessions after the infection from a different country and device, without a multi-factor authentication prompt.
Which MITRE techniques is it associated with?
How should a SOC analyst respond?
  1. Isolate the device from the network; do not reinstall it before taking memory and disk images.
  2. Determine the infection date; list all accounts that were signed in on the device after that date.
  3. Change the passwords of these accounts, revoke their sessions and access tokens, and re-enroll multi-factor authentication devices.
  4. Search identity provider and SaaS logs for new country, device and token usage after the infection.
  5. If a recovery phrase or wallet file was exposed, move the assets to a new wallet.
  6. Find the initial access path (email, ad, unlicensed software, fake CAPTCHA) and check other users who used the same path.
  7. Reinstall the device from a clean image.
15

Sources

From the Essential plan

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