DecliningWindowsCredential theft
Malware Intelligence

RisePro

RisePro is an infostealer spread through loaders such as PrivateLoader. It collects card details, passwords and personal data.

Activity map

Activity mapDownloadDownloadsPackagingExfiltrationDownloadExtractionExecutionUnlicensedsoftware siteCrack sitesPrivateLoaderPay-per-install (PPI)RiseProInfostealerData collection21 targetsLog archiveC2 serverFake GitHubrepositoryCracked softwareRARPassword-protectedarchiveEXEInflated installer
Executable payloadFile
Malicious payloadRisePro · Infostealer

RisePro is an infostealer spread through loaders such as PrivateLoader. It collects card details, passwords and personal data.

Appears in flows

Environment information

  • Operating system
  • Hardware
  • IP and location
  • Installed software
  • Screenshot
  • Desktop files

Credentials and application data

  • Saved passwords
  • Session cookies
  • Autofill
  • Saved cards
  • Steam
  • FileZilla
  • Telegram
  • Electrum
  • Discord
  • Bitcoin Core
  • Battle.net
  • MetaMask
  • Trust Wallet
  • Coinbase Wallet
Dark Radar infection records
632,772
Latest infection record
26 February 2026
Malware type
Infostealer
First seen
2022
01

Overview

Ranks 9 of 52 families in Dark Radar data, with 632,772 infection records.

02

Origin and evolution

  1. 2022Began to be distributed through the PrivateLoader pay-per-install service.Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE)
  2. 2024Campaign using fake GitHub repositories.G DATA
  3. 2024Named among the credential sources in the Snowflake incident.Google Cloud (Mandiant)
03

Technical profile

Malware typeInfostealer
Target operating systemWindows
Primary purposeData theft
Threat categoryCredential theft
Programming languageC++
Distribution modelSold via Telegram; distributed with PrivateLoader
First seen2022
Public source confidenceMedium
04

Targeted applications

21 applications8 categories
05

Data collection

Credentials

  • Browser passwords100%Verified
  • Session cookies93.5%Verified
  • Refreshing expired sessions—
  • Autofill87%Dark Radar observation
  • macOS Keychain—
  • 2FA and password managers—

Financial

  • Saved cardsVerified
  • Desktop crypto wallets17.4%Verified
  • Wallet extensions6.5%Reported
  • Clipboard address replacement—

Applications

  • Email clients4.3%Dark Radar observation
  • FTP clients23.9%Dark Radar observation
  • VPN clients—
  • Messaging applications19.6%Dark Radar observation
  • Gaming platforms37%Dark Radar observation

System

  • File collection17.4%Reported
  • Screenshot8.7%Reported
  • System inventory58.7%Verified
06

File system

User profile (%USERPROFILE%)
File details are in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
07

System components

  • System and hardware information
08

How it works

  1. 1Infection

    • PrivateLoader pay-per-install network.
    • Fake GitHub repositories and unlicensed software.

    Breaking point: Email attachments, sponsored ad links and unlicensed software downloads are blocked at the email and web gateway.

  2. 2Execution and evasion

    Dark Radar observation

    The payload ran from the LocalAppData folder (latest 200 logs, 47.8%).

    The payload ran from the ProgramData folder (latest 200 logs, 21.7%).

    Ran inside the legitimate MSBuild.exe process (latest 200 logs, 4.3%).

    Ran from the w3hj9d624fcijsf1vg7f.exe file in the Windows folder (latest 200 logs, 4.3%).

    T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File

    Breaking point: Unsigned files running from user folders and injections into .NET tools are stopped by application control and EDR.

  3. 3Discovery

    T1082System Information Discovery

    Breaking point: Bulk system and security software queries from a short-lived process trigger an EDR alert.

  4. 4Data collection

    • Browser, card and wallet data.
    Dark Radar observation

    Data found in the latest 200 logs: password file 100%, cookies 93.5%, autofill 87%, wallets 12%.

    T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1005Data from Local System

    Breaking point: A process other than the browser reading browser profile files is blocked or triggers an alert.

  5. 5Exfiltration and C2

    • Sending to the C2 server.
    T1071.001Web ProtocolsT1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

    Breaking point: Traffic to newly registered domains, direct IP addresses and non-standard ports is blocked.

09

Network communication

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
10

MITRE ATT&CK

Execution
Credential Access
Discovery
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
11

IOCs and detection

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
12

Risk and impact

  • Stolen session cookies are enough to take over cloud, email and SaaS sessions without a password or multi-factor authentication prompt.
  • Corporate passwords saved on personal devices also leak through infections outside the corporate network; these logs are sold to initial access brokers.
  • Log archives are reshared for years; as long as the password is not changed, the same credential can be used again and again.
  • Compromised email, messaging and social media accounts become the next link in phishing and malware distribution.
13

Defense

  • When an infection is detected, revoke not only the password but all related sessions and access tokens.
  • Turn off password saving in the browser through corporate policy; use a corporate password manager.
  • Move to phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (FIDO2/passkey); bind sessions to the device.
  • Block setup files downloaded from unlicensed software, game cheats and sponsored search results.
  • Monitor flows where the user runs a command by pasting it into the Run dialog or terminal (ClickFix) with endpoint rules.
  • Continuously monitor your corporate domains and employee email addresses in stealer logs with Dark Radar.
14

Learning center

How does this malware spread?
  • PrivateLoader pay-per-install network.
  • Fake GitHub repositories and unlicensed software.
  • The payload ran from the LocalAppData folder (latest 200 logs, 47.8%).
  • The payload ran from the ProgramData folder (latest 200 logs, 21.7%).
How can its presence on a system be detected?
  • Sign-ins to accounts from an unrecognized country or device.
  • A new infostealer log in Dark Radar for your corporate domain or an employee email address.
Which Windows artifacts should be examined?
  • Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch) — shows that a short-lived payload ran.
  • Amcache.hve and ShimCache — path and hash of the executed file.
  • Downloads folder and Zone.Identifier stream — the address the file was downloaded from.
  • Browser history — the fake download page or fake CAPTCHA address.
  • RunMRU registry key — commands pasted into the Run dialog.
  • Randomly named folders and DLLs under %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%.
Which log records matter?
  • Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688Process creation: unsigned processes starting from Temp and Downloads folders, mshta, powershell -enc chains.
  • Sysmon Olay 11 / 23File creation and deletion: self-deleting payloads, DLLs dropped under Temp.
  • Sysmon Olay 3 / 22Network connection and DNS query: to newly registered domains, C2 resolution via Telegram, Steam or Pastebin.
  • Object access auditing (4663)A process other than the browser reading Login Data, Cookies and Local State files.
  • PowerShell 4104Script block logging: obfuscated downloader commands.
  • Identity provider sign-in logsSessions after the infection from a different country and device, without a multi-factor authentication prompt.
Which MITRE techniques is it associated with?
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1082System Information DiscoveryT1005Data from Local SystemT1071.001Web ProtocolsT1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol
How should a SOC analyst respond?
  1. Isolate the device from the network; do not reinstall it before taking memory and disk images.
  2. Determine the infection date; list all accounts that were signed in on the device after that date.
  3. Change the passwords of these accounts, revoke their sessions and access tokens, and re-enroll multi-factor authentication devices.
  4. Search identity provider and SaaS logs for new country, device and token usage after the infection.
  5. If a recovery phrase or wallet file was exposed, move the assets to a new wallet.
  6. Find the initial access path (email, ad, unlicensed software, fake CAPTCHA) and check other users who used the same path.
  7. Reinstall the device from a clean image.
15

Sources

Related families

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Related terms

Credential leak
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