Active threat familyWindowsCredential theft
Malware Intelligence

Aura Stealer

Aura Stealer is an infostealer sold by tiered subscription since July 2025 by an actor named "AuraCorp". It is advertised as targeting more than 110 browsers, 70 applications and more than 250 browser extensions; it decrypts Chromium app-bound encryption on the server side.

Activity map

Activity mapInjectionPackagingExfiltrationAura StealerInfostealer and loaderilasm.exeDark Radar 63.6%Data collection28 targetsLog archiveC2 server
Executable payloadFileDark Radar evidence
Malicious payloadAura Stealer · Infostealer and loader

Aura Stealer is an infostealer sold by tiered subscription since July 2025 by an actor named "AuraCorp". It is advertised as targeting more than 110 browsers, 70 applications and more than 250 browser extensions; it decrypts Chromium app-bound encryption on the server side.

Environment information

  • Operating system
  • Hardware
  • IP and location
  • Installed software
  • Screenshot

Credentials and application data

  • Saved passwords
  • Session cookies
  • Session refresh data
  • Autofill
  • Saved cards
  • 2FA seeds
  • Steam
  • Discord
  • Microsoft Outlook
  • Battle.net
  • FileZilla
  • NordVPN
  • Telegram
  • MetaMask
Dark Radar infection records
40,818
Latest infection record
29 October 2026
Malware type
Infostealer and loader
First seen
July 2025
01

Overview

Ranks 23 of 52 families in Dark Radar data, with 40,818 infection records.

Other names: AURASTEAL

02

Origin and evolution

  1. July 2025Went on sale as a service on forums.Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE)
03

Technical profile

Malware typeInfostealer and loader
Target operating systemWindows
Primary purposeCredential and session theft
Threat categoryCredential theft
Programming languageC++
Distribution modelTiered subscription (MaaS)
First seenJuly 2025
Public source confidenceMedium
04

Targeted applications

28 applications10 categories
05

Data collection

Credentials

  • Browser passwords98%Verified
  • Session cookies100%Verified
  • Refreshing expired sessions40%Dark Radar observation
  • Autofill91.5%Dark Radar observation
  • macOS Keychain—
  • 2FA and password managersVerified

Financial

  • Saved cards17.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Desktop crypto wallets4.5%Verified
  • Wallet extensionsVerified
  • Clipboard address replacement—

Applications

  • Email clients7%Dark Radar observation
  • FTP clients4.5%Dark Radar observation
  • VPN clients4.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Messaging applications20.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Gaming platforms64%Dark Radar observation

System

  • File collection—
  • Screenshot9%Dark Radar observation
  • System inventory99%Dark Radar observation

Behavior

  • Additional payload downloadVerified
  • Persistence—
  • Anti-analysisVerified
06

File system

User profile (%USERPROFILE%)
File details are in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
07

How it works

  1. 1Execution and evasion

    Dark Radar observation

    Ran inside the legitimate ilasm.exe process (latest 200 logs, 63.6%).

    Ran from the install.exe file in the Windows folder (latest 200 logs, 27.3%).

    T1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

    Breaking point: Unsigned files running from user folders and injections into .NET tools are stopped by application control and EDR.

  2. 2Discovery

    T1082System Information Discovery

    Breaking point: Bulk system and security software queries from a short-lived process trigger an EDR alert.

  3. 3Data collection

    Dark Radar observation

    Data found in the latest 200 logs: password file 98%, cookies 100%, autofill 91.5%, cards 17.5%, wallets 4.5%.

    T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1005Data from Local SystemT1555.005Password Managers

    Breaking point: A process other than the browser reading browser profile files is blocked or triggers an alert.

  4. 4Exfiltration and C2

    T1071.001Web ProtocolsT1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1573Encrypted ChannelT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

    Breaking point: Traffic to newly registered domains, direct IP addresses and non-standard ports is blocked.

08

Network communication

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
09

MITRE ATT&CK

Execution
Credential Access
Discovery
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Defense Evasion
10

IOCs and detection

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
11

Risk and impact

  • Stolen session cookies are enough to take over cloud, email and SaaS sessions without a password or multi-factor authentication prompt.
  • Corporate passwords saved on personal devices also leak through infections outside the corporate network; these logs are sold to initial access brokers.
  • Log archives are reshared for years; as long as the password is not changed, the same credential can be used again and again.
  • Compromised email, messaging and social media accounts become the next link in phishing and malware distribution.
12

Defense

  • When an infection is detected, revoke not only the password but all related sessions and access tokens.
  • Turn off password saving in the browser through corporate policy; use a corporate password manager.
  • Move to phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (FIDO2/passkey); bind sessions to the device.
  • Block setup files downloaded from unlicensed software, game cheats and sponsored search results.
  • Monitor flows where the user runs a command by pasting it into the Run dialog or terminal (ClickFix) with endpoint rules.
  • Continuously monitor your corporate domains and employee email addresses in stealer logs with Dark Radar.
13

Learning center

How does this malware spread?
  • Infostealer families mostly spread through unlicensed software, fake updates, sponsored search ads and phishing emails.
How can its presence on a system be detected?
  • Sign-ins to accounts from an unrecognized country or device.
  • A new infostealer log in Dark Radar for your corporate domain or an employee email address.
Which Windows artifacts should be examined?
  • Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch) — shows that a short-lived payload ran.
  • Amcache.hve and ShimCache — path and hash of the executed file.
  • Downloads folder and Zone.Identifier stream — the address the file was downloaded from.
  • Browser history — the fake download page or fake CAPTCHA address.
  • RunMRU registry key — commands pasted into the Run dialog.
  • Randomly named folders and DLLs under %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%.
Which log records matter?
  • Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688Process creation: unsigned processes starting from Temp and Downloads folders, mshta, powershell -enc chains.
  • Sysmon Olay 11 / 23File creation and deletion: self-deleting payloads, DLLs dropped under Temp.
  • Sysmon Olay 3 / 22Network connection and DNS query: to newly registered domains, C2 resolution via Telegram, Steam or Pastebin.
  • Object access auditing (4663)A process other than the browser reading Login Data, Cookies and Local State files.
  • PowerShell 4104Script block logging: obfuscated downloader commands.
  • Identity provider sign-in logsSessions after the infection from a different country and device, without a multi-factor authentication prompt.
Which MITRE techniques is it associated with?
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1082System Information DiscoveryT1005Data from Local SystemT1071.001Web ProtocolsT1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1555.005Password ManagersT1027Obfuscated Files or InformationT1573Encrypted ChannelT1105Ingress Tool Transfer
How should a SOC analyst respond?
  1. Isolate the device from the network; do not reinstall it before taking memory and disk images.
  2. Determine the infection date; list all accounts that were signed in on the device after that date.
  3. Change the passwords of these accounts, revoke their sessions and access tokens, and re-enroll multi-factor authentication devices.
  4. Search identity provider and SaaS logs for new country, device and token usage after the infection.
  5. If a recovery phrase or wallet file was exposed, move the assets to a new wallet.
  6. Find the initial access path (email, ad, unlicensed software, fake CAPTCHA) and check other users who used the same path.
  7. Reinstall the device from a clean image.
14

Sources

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