DecliningWindowsFinancial fraud
Malware Intelligence

ClipBanker

ClipBanker is a trojan that replaces crypto wallet addresses on the clipboard and collects browser history, cookies, and Outlook, Skype and Telegram data.

Activity map

Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE)

Activity mapExecutionPackagingExfiltrationPhishing emailSocial media postPowerShellCommandsClipBankerClipboard replacer and in…Data collection11 targetsLog archiveC2 server
Malicious payloadClipBanker · Clipboard replacer and infostealer

ClipBanker is a trojan that replaces crypto wallet addresses on the clipboard and collects browser history, cookies, and Outlook, Skype and Telegram data.

Environment information

  • Operating system
  • Hardware
  • IP and location
  • Installed software
  • Screenshot

Credentials and application data

  • Saved passwords
  • Session cookies
  • Autofill
  • Saved cards
  • Discord
  • Steam
  • Telegram
  • Battle.net
  • Microsoft Outlook
Dark Radar infection records
734
Latest infection record
2 March 2026
Malware type
Clipboard replacer and infostealer
Infected systems
Windows 10 25.5%
01

Overview

Ranks 47 of 52 families in Dark Radar data, with 734 infection records.

Other names: ClipBlanker

02

Technical profile

Malware typeClipboard replacer and infostealer
Target operating systemWindows
Primary purposeCrypto asset theft
Threat categoryFinancial fraud
Distribution modelVarious
Infected systemsWindows 10 25.5%, Windows 11 21%
Public source confidenceLow
03

Targeted applications

11 applications5 categories
04

Data collection

Credentials

  • Browser passwords96.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Session cookies96%Verified
  • Refreshing expired sessions—
  • Autofill91%Dark Radar observation
  • macOS Keychain—
  • 2FA and password managers—

Financial

  • Saved cards28.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Desktop crypto wallets98.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Wallet extensions—
  • Clipboard address replacementVerified

Applications

  • Email clientsReported
  • FTP clients—
  • VPN clients—
  • Messaging applications27.5%Reported
  • Gaming platforms17.5%Dark Radar observation

System

  • File collection—
  • Screenshot35.5%Dark Radar observation
  • System inventory90.5%Dark Radar observation
05

File system

User profile (%USERPROFILE%)
File details are in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
06

How it works

  1. 1Execution and evasion

    T1059.001PowerShell

    Breaking point: Unsigned files running from user folders and injections into .NET tools are stopped by application control and EDR.

  2. 2Discovery

    Dark Radar observation

    Infected systems: Windows 10 25.5%, Windows 11 21%, Windows Server 9.5%.

    Breaking point: Bulk system and security software queries from a short-lived process trigger an EDR alert.

  3. 3Data collection

    Dark Radar observation

    Data found in the latest 200 logs: password file 96.5%, cookies 96%, autofill 91%, cards 28.5%, wallets 98.5%.

    T1115Clipboard DataT1539Steal Web Session Cookie

    Breaking point: A process other than the browser reading browser profile files is blocked or triggers an alert.

  4. 4Persistence and aftermath

    T1565.002Transmitted Data Manipulation

    Breaking point: When an infection is confirmed, all sessions and access tokens on the device are revoked.

07

MITRE ATT&CK

Execution
Collection
Impact
Credential Access
08

IOCs and detection

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
09

Risk and impact

  • Stolen session cookies are enough to take over cloud, email and SaaS sessions without a password or multi-factor authentication prompt.
  • Corporate passwords saved on personal devices also leak through infections outside the corporate network; these logs are sold to initial access brokers.
  • Log archives are reshared for years; as long as the password is not changed, the same credential can be used again and again.
  • Compromised email, messaging and social media accounts become the next link in phishing and malware distribution.
10

Defense

  • When an infection is detected, revoke not only the password but all related sessions and access tokens.
  • Turn off password saving in the browser through corporate policy; use a corporate password manager.
  • Move to phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (FIDO2/passkey); bind sessions to the device.
  • Block setup files downloaded from unlicensed software, game cheats and sponsored search results.
  • Monitor flows where the user runs a command by pasting it into the Run dialog or terminal (ClickFix) with endpoint rules.
  • Continuously monitor your corporate domains and employee email addresses in stealer logs with Dark Radar.
11

Learning center

How does this malware spread?
  • Infostealer families mostly spread through unlicensed software, fake updates, sponsored search ads and phishing emails.
How can its presence on a system be detected?
  • Sign-ins to accounts from an unrecognized country or device.
  • A new infostealer log in Dark Radar for your corporate domain or an employee email address.
Which Windows artifacts should be examined?
  • Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch) — shows that a short-lived payload ran.
  • Amcache.hve and ShimCache — path and hash of the executed file.
  • Downloads folder and Zone.Identifier stream — the address the file was downloaded from.
  • Browser history — the fake download page or fake CAPTCHA address.
  • RunMRU registry key — commands pasted into the Run dialog.
  • Randomly named folders and DLLs under %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%.
Which log records matter?
  • Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688Process creation: unsigned processes starting from Temp and Downloads folders, mshta, powershell -enc chains.
  • Sysmon Olay 11 / 23File creation and deletion: self-deleting payloads, DLLs dropped under Temp.
  • Sysmon Olay 3 / 22Network connection and DNS query: to newly registered domains, C2 resolution via Telegram, Steam or Pastebin.
  • Object access auditing (4663)A process other than the browser reading Login Data, Cookies and Local State files.
  • PowerShell 4104Script block logging: obfuscated downloader commands.
  • Identity provider sign-in logsSessions after the infection from a different country and device, without a multi-factor authentication prompt.
Which MITRE techniques is it associated with?
T1059.001PowerShellT1115Clipboard DataT1565.002Transmitted Data ManipulationT1539Steal Web Session Cookie
How should a SOC analyst respond?
  1. Isolate the device from the network; do not reinstall it before taking memory and disk images.
  2. Determine the infection date; list all accounts that were signed in on the device after that date.
  3. Change the passwords of these accounts, revoke their sessions and access tokens, and re-enroll multi-factor authentication devices.
  4. Search identity provider and SaaS logs for new country, device and token usage after the infection.
  5. If a recovery phrase or wallet file was exposed, move the assets to a new wallet.
  6. Find the initial access path (email, ad, unlicensed software, fake CAPTCHA) and check other users who used the same path.
  7. Reinstall the device from a clean image.
12

Sources

Related terms

Wallet theft
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