InactiveWindowsCredential theft
Malware Intelligence

Eternity Stealer

Eternity Stealer is part of the Eternity Project, which sells stealer, clipboard-replacement, miner, worm and ransomware modules separately.

Activity map

Activity mapInjectionPackagingExfiltrationEternity StealerInfostealerInstallUtil.exeDark Radar 38.6%Data collection15 targetsLog archiveC2 server
Executable payloadFileDark Radar evidence
Malicious payloadEternity Stealer · Infostealer

Eternity Stealer is part of the Eternity Project, which sells stealer, clipboard-replacement, miner, worm and ransomware modules separately.

Environment information

  • Operating system
  • Hardware
  • IP and location
  • Installed software
  • Screenshot
  • Desktop files

Credentials and application data

  • Saved passwords
  • Session cookies
  • Autofill
  • Saved cards
  • Steam
  • Discord
  • Telegram
  • Exodus
  • Electrum
  • NordVPN
  • FileZilla
Dark Radar infection records
42,473
Latest infection record
9 September 2025
Malware type
Infostealer
First seen
2022
01

Overview

Ranks 22 of 52 families in Dark Radar data, with 42,473 infection records.

02

Origin and evolution

  1. 2022The Eternity Project began modular sales via Tor and Telegram.BlackBerry
03

Technical profile

Malware typeInfostealer
Target operating systemWindows
Primary purposeData theft
Threat categoryCredential theft
Programming language.NET
Distribution modelModular sale under the Eternity Project
First seen2022
Infected systemsWindows 10 43.5%, Windows 11 16%
Public source confidenceMedium
04

Targeted applications

15 applications7 categories
05

Data collection

Credentials

  • Browser passwords67.3%Verified
  • Session cookies85.3%Verified
  • Refreshing expired sessions—
  • Autofill94%Dark Radar observation
  • macOS Keychain—
  • 2FA and password managers—

Financial

  • Saved cards4.5%Dark Radar observation
  • Desktop crypto wallets6.5%Verified
  • Wallet extensions—
  • Clipboard address replacement—

Applications

  • Email clients—
  • FTP clientsReported
  • VPN clientsReported
  • Messaging applications36%Reported
  • Gaming platforms40.7%Reported

System

  • File collection52.7%Dark Radar observation
  • Screenshot96%Dark Radar observation
  • System inventory100%Dark Radar observation
06

File system

User profile (%USERPROFILE%)
File details are in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
07

How it works

  1. 1Execution and evasion

    Dark Radar observation

    The payload ran from the temporary folder (latest 200 logs, 40.9%).

    Ran inside the legitimate InstallUtil.exe process (latest 200 logs, 38.6%).

    Ran inside the legitimate vbc.exe process (latest 200 logs, 18.9%).

    Breaking point: Unsigned files running from user folders and injections into .NET tools are stopped by application control and EDR.

  2. 2Discovery

    Dark Radar observation

    Infected systems: Windows 10 43.5%, Windows 11 16%, Windows 7 11.5%.

    Breaking point: Bulk system and security software queries from a short-lived process trigger an EDR alert.

  3. 3Data collection

    Dark Radar observation

    Data found in the latest 200 logs: password file 67.3%, cookies 85.3%, autofill 94%, cards 4.5%, wallets 6.5%.

    Breaking point: A process other than the browser reading browser profile files is blocked or triggers an alert.

08

IOCs and detection

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
09

Risk and impact

  • Stolen session cookies are enough to take over cloud, email and SaaS sessions without a password or multi-factor authentication prompt.
  • Corporate passwords saved on personal devices also leak through infections outside the corporate network; these logs are sold to initial access brokers.
  • Log archives are reshared for years; as long as the password is not changed, the same credential can be used again and again.
  • Compromised email, messaging and social media accounts become the next link in phishing and malware distribution.
10

Defense

  • When an infection is detected, revoke not only the password but all related sessions and access tokens.
  • Turn off password saving in the browser through corporate policy; use a corporate password manager.
  • Move to phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (FIDO2/passkey); bind sessions to the device.
  • Block setup files downloaded from unlicensed software, game cheats and sponsored search results.
  • Monitor flows where the user runs a command by pasting it into the Run dialog or terminal (ClickFix) with endpoint rules.
  • Continuously monitor your corporate domains and employee email addresses in stealer logs with Dark Radar.
11

Learning center

How does this malware spread?
  • The payload ran from the temporary folder (latest 200 logs, 40.9%).
  • Infostealer families mostly spread through unlicensed software, fake updates, sponsored search ads and phishing emails.
How can its presence on a system be detected?
  • Sign-ins to accounts from an unrecognized country or device.
  • A new infostealer log in Dark Radar for your corporate domain or an employee email address.
Which Windows artifacts should be examined?
  • Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch) — shows that a short-lived payload ran.
  • Amcache.hve and ShimCache — path and hash of the executed file.
  • Downloads folder and Zone.Identifier stream — the address the file was downloaded from.
  • Browser history — the fake download page or fake CAPTCHA address.
  • RunMRU registry key — commands pasted into the Run dialog.
  • Randomly named folders and DLLs under %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%.
Which log records matter?
  • Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688Process creation: unsigned processes starting from Temp and Downloads folders, mshta, powershell -enc chains.
  • Sysmon Olay 11 / 23File creation and deletion: self-deleting payloads, DLLs dropped under Temp.
  • Sysmon Olay 3 / 22Network connection and DNS query: to newly registered domains, C2 resolution via Telegram, Steam or Pastebin.
  • Object access auditing (4663)A process other than the browser reading Login Data, Cookies and Local State files.
  • PowerShell 4104Script block logging: obfuscated downloader commands.
  • Identity provider sign-in logsSessions after the infection from a different country and device, without a multi-factor authentication prompt.
How should a SOC analyst respond?
  1. Isolate the device from the network; do not reinstall it before taking memory and disk images.
  2. Determine the infection date; list all accounts that were signed in on the device after that date.
  3. Change the passwords of these accounts, revoke their sessions and access tokens, and re-enroll multi-factor authentication devices.
  4. Search identity provider and SaaS logs for new country, device and token usage after the infection.
  5. If a recovery phrase or wallet file was exposed, move the assets to a new wallet.
  6. Find the initial access path (email, ad, unlicensed software, fake CAPTCHA) and check other users who used the same path.
  7. Reinstall the device from a clean image.
12

Sources

Related terms

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