DecliningWindowsCredential theft
Malware Intelligence

Stealerium

Stealerium is an infostealer published as open source on GitHub. Besides browsers, wallets and many applications, it collects Wi-Fi networks, the Windows product key and webcam images; it has keylogging and clipboard-replacement modules.

Activity map

Proofpoint

Activity mapExecutionInjectionPackagingExfiltrationPhishing emailInvoice, paymentZIPArchiveJSScriptISODisk imageEXE.NET payloadStealeriumInfostealerDiscord webhookExfiltrationAppLaunch.exeDark Radar 100%Data collection24 targetsLog archive
Executable payloadFileDark Radar evidence
Malicious payloadStealerium · Infostealer

Stealerium is an infostealer published as open source on GitHub. Besides browsers, wallets and many applications, it collects Wi-Fi networks, the Windows product key and webcam images; it has keylogging and clipboard-replacement modules.

Environment information

  • Operating system
  • Hardware
  • IP and location
  • Installed software
  • Screenshot
  • Desktop files

Credentials and application data

  • Saved passwords
  • Session cookies
  • Autofill
  • Saved cards
  • FileZilla
  • Discord
  • Telegram
  • Steam
  • Exodus
  • Electrum
  • Atomic Wallet
  • Bitcoin Core
  • Ethereum keystore
  • Coinomi
Dark Radar infection records
199
Latest infection record
19 March 2026
Malware type
Infostealer (open source)
First seen
2022
01

Overview

Ranks 49 of 52 families in Dark Radar data, with 199 infection records.

02

Origin and evolution

  1. 2025Its use in email campaigns increased.Proofpoint
03

Technical profile

Malware typeInfostealer (open source)
Target operating systemWindows
Primary purposeData theft
Threat categoryCredential theft
Programming languageC#
Distribution modelOpen source on GitHub
First seen2022
Public source confidenceHigh
04

Targeted applications

24 applications8 categories
05

Data collection

Credentials

  • Browser passwords92%Verified
  • Session cookies24.1%Verified
  • Refreshing expired sessions—
  • Autofill58.3%Dark Radar observation
  • macOS Keychain—
  • 2FA and password managers—

Financial

  • Saved cards3%Dark Radar observation
  • Desktop crypto wallets26.6%Verified
  • Wallet extensions—
  • Clipboard address replacementVerified

Applications

  • Email clientsVerified
  • FTP clients25.1%Dark Radar observation
  • VPN clientsVerified
  • Messaging applications7%Verified
  • Gaming platforms3.5%Verified

System

  • File collection80.9%Dark Radar observation
  • Screenshot4.5%Verified
  • System inventory80.4%Verified

Behavior

  • Additional payload download—
  • Persistence—
  • Anti-analysisVerified
06

File system

User profile (%USERPROFILE%)
File details are in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
07

How it works

  1. 1Execution and evasion

    Dark Radar observation

    Ran inside the legitimate AppLaunch.exe process (latest 199 logs, 100%).

    T1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

    Breaking point: Unsigned files running from user folders and injections into .NET tools are stopped by application control and EDR.

  2. 2Discovery

    T1082System Information Discovery

    Breaking point: Bulk system and security software queries from a short-lived process trigger an EDR alert.

  3. 3Data collection

    Dark Radar observation

    Data found in the latest 199 logs: password file 92%, cookies 24.1%, autofill 58.3%, cards 3%, wallets 26.6%.

    T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1005Data from Local SystemT1056.001KeyloggingT1115Clipboard DataT1113Screen Capture

    Breaking point: A process other than the browser reading browser profile files is blocked or triggers an alert.

  4. 4Exfiltration and C2

    T1071.001Web ProtocolsT1567Exfiltration Over Web Service

    Breaking point: Traffic to newly registered domains, direct IP addresses and non-standard ports is blocked.

  5. 5Persistence and aftermath

    T1565.002Transmitted Data Manipulation

    Breaking point: When an infection is confirmed, all sessions and access tokens on the device are revoked.

08

Network communication

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
09

MITRE ATT&CK

Execution
Credential Access
Discovery
Collection
Command and Control
Impact
Defense Evasion
Exfiltration
10

IOCs and detection

This section is in Dark Radar IntelligenceOpen in Intelligence
11

Risk and impact

  • Stolen session cookies are enough to take over cloud, email and SaaS sessions without a password or multi-factor authentication prompt.
  • Corporate passwords saved on personal devices also leak through infections outside the corporate network; these logs are sold to initial access brokers.
  • Log archives are reshared for years; as long as the password is not changed, the same credential can be used again and again.
  • Compromised email, messaging and social media accounts become the next link in phishing and malware distribution.
12

Defense

  • When an infection is detected, revoke not only the password but all related sessions and access tokens.
  • Turn off password saving in the browser through corporate policy; use a corporate password manager.
  • Move to phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (FIDO2/passkey); bind sessions to the device.
  • Block setup files downloaded from unlicensed software, game cheats and sponsored search results.
  • Monitor flows where the user runs a command by pasting it into the Run dialog or terminal (ClickFix) with endpoint rules.
  • Continuously monitor your corporate domains and employee email addresses in stealer logs with Dark Radar.
13

Learning center

How does this malware spread?
  • Infostealer families mostly spread through unlicensed software, fake updates, sponsored search ads and phishing emails.
How can its presence on a system be detected?
  • Sign-ins to accounts from an unrecognized country or device.
  • A new infostealer log in Dark Radar for your corporate domain or an employee email address.
Which Windows artifacts should be examined?
  • Prefetch (C:\Windows\Prefetch) — shows that a short-lived payload ran.
  • Amcache.hve and ShimCache — path and hash of the executed file.
  • Downloads folder and Zone.Identifier stream — the address the file was downloaded from.
  • Browser history — the fake download page or fake CAPTCHA address.
  • RunMRU registry key — commands pasted into the Run dialog.
  • Randomly named folders and DLLs under %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%.
Which log records matter?
  • Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688Process creation: unsigned processes starting from Temp and Downloads folders, mshta, powershell -enc chains.
  • Sysmon Olay 11 / 23File creation and deletion: self-deleting payloads, DLLs dropped under Temp.
  • Sysmon Olay 3 / 22Network connection and DNS query: to newly registered domains, C2 resolution via Telegram, Steam or Pastebin.
  • Object access auditing (4663)A process other than the browser reading Login Data, Cookies and Local State files.
  • PowerShell 4104Script block logging: obfuscated downloader commands.
  • Identity provider sign-in logsSessions after the infection from a different country and device, without a multi-factor authentication prompt.
Which MITRE techniques is it associated with?
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersT1539Steal Web Session CookieT1082System Information DiscoveryT1005Data from Local SystemT1071.001Web ProtocolsT1056.001KeyloggingT1115Clipboard DataT1565.002Transmitted Data ManipulationT1113Screen CaptureT1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionT1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
How should a SOC analyst respond?
  1. Isolate the device from the network; do not reinstall it before taking memory and disk images.
  2. Determine the infection date; list all accounts that were signed in on the device after that date.
  3. Change the passwords of these accounts, revoke their sessions and access tokens, and re-enroll multi-factor authentication devices.
  4. Search identity provider and SaaS logs for new country, device and token usage after the infection.
  5. If a recovery phrase or wallet file was exposed, move the assets to a new wallet.
  6. Find the initial access path (email, ad, unlicensed software, fake CAPTCHA) and check other users who used the same path.
  7. Reinstall the device from a clean image.
14

Sources

Related families

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Related terms

BuilderForm grabbingKeyloggingSession hijackingData exfiltration
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